Just 100 days in, President Lee’s grip is already loosening
On the surface, President Lee’s first 100 days in office appear to be a resounding success.
This period, typically a “honeymoon” for any new presidency, seems particularly sweet for him: his approval rating is near 60%; his Minjoo Party enjoys a near-supermajority in the parliament that will last until 2028; and the conservative opposition is still reeling from the aftermath of a half-baked coup attempt, with no clear prospect of recovery on the horizon.
Mr Lee is arguably the most powerful president ever in the Sixth Republic of Korea.
However, beneath this polished exterior, cracks are beginning to show. A closer look reveals signs of instability and challenges to the president’s authority.
How much control does Lee have on personnel?
Appointments to key posts are often the best indicator of how power is distributed within a governing coalition. These battles for influence typically happen behind the scenes, rarely reaching the public eye. One less-discussed incident, however, reveals one of the key challenges the Lee administration faces.
In June, President Lee’s choice of Song Ki-ho for Director of the National Situation Room국정상황실장 raised eyebrows including mine. This division of the presidential office compiles sensitive information from various agencies, including the national spy agency and the police, directly for the president. Given its sensitive nature, the post is typically reserved for someone the president trusts implicitly, especially after the administration announced plans to elevate the office to the role of the administration’s “control tower.”
Instead, Mr Lee appointed a lawyer specializing in international trade who was not considered a close confidant. Curiously, he was replaced just a month later by an aide known to be much closer to the president. No official accusations were made against Mr. Song, who now serves as an aide for economic security.
This and other instances of personnel friction suggest that competing factions are vying for influence. President Lee either lacks a firm grip on these factions or is attempting to manage them by instigating loyalty competitions. While this may help him maintain personal control, it does little to ensure stable governance for a country facing a series of challenges.
The new party chief willing to undermine Lee’s position
The most surprising event of President Lee’s first 100 days was the result of the Minjoo Party’s leadership election. Most observers, myself included, expected Park Chan-dae to win—he had led the party during the presidential campaign and was supported by Lee’s allies.
Jung Chung-rae’s stunning victory proved President Lee’s grip on his party is less firm than previously imagined.
Despite being a four-term lawmaker, Mr Jung has always been an outsider. He has consistently been more radical than his peers, a trait dating back to his student activist days. He was sentenced to prison for an attempted arson on the U.S. Ambassador’s residence in 1989. While Mr Jung is not the only Gen-86 politician to have served jail time, many of his contemporaries were imprisoned for leading activist groups, unlike Mr Jung, who was seen as more of a foot soldier.
Due to their emphasis on pedigree, the mainstream Gen-86 politicians—many of whom attended top-tier universities and were part of the activist leadership—never saw Mr Jung as their peer. One prominent politician, who possessed both of these credentials, allegedly refused to even sit at the same table with him.
However, his rebellious image aided his entry into politics. Though he lacked the traditional pedigree, he successfully leveraged the internet, co-founding an internet-based civic organization in 2003 that became his launchpad. His political positions often reflect the types of opinions that gain the most traction in online communities. Throughout his career, Mr Jung built a reputation as a maverick, and his tendency not to mince words, even with party colleagues, cost him the party’s nomination in 2016.
This is why his victory was so unexpected. He is not a traditional politician skilled at the art of compromise and alliance-building; in fact, he excels at the opposite. Meanwhile, his opponent had the backing of President Lee and many party heavyweights.
The breakdown of the election results is telling. While Mr Park won more votes from party delegates, Jung garnered an overwhelming majority of votes from rank-and-file party members. This outcome suggests a disconnect, as the same party members who supported Lee for the presidency chose Mr Jung, the outsider, over Mr Park, President Lee’s preferred candidate.
So, what tipped the scales? Enter Kim Ou-joon, the Minjoo Party’s Tucker Carlson.
The Kim Ou-joon Factor
As I’ve noted before, Kim Ou-joon’s influence in Korean politics is immense. Among Minjoo Party members and supporters, his words are treated as gospel.
Mr Jung has been not only a frequent guest on Mr Kim’s podcast but also an active participant on its online message board. A watershed moment occurred when Mr Kim hosted a large “talk concert” a few weeks before the election. While Park was absent, Jung appeared on stage, sharing the spotlight with former President Moon Jae-in and his political allies.
After Mr Jung’s win, the media lamented Mr Kim’s influence. Interestingly, even left-leaning media outlets, often aligned with Mr Kim, joined the criticism. (A cynical interpretation is that former allies have now become competitors for influence over the new administration.)
“As a figure who leads a fandom, Mr Kim sets agendas and influences decision-making,” a former Democratic Party lawmaker said. “I believe he had an impact on the party convention as well.”
“Mr Kim supported Jung Chung-rae, and that worked decisively in his favor for the election,” a first-term Democratic Party lawmaker said. “If Mr Kim had framed his support for Mr Jung differently, it would not have been such an easy victory for him.”
Park Song-yi, Lee Hyo-sang (2025, September 8). ‘Kim Ou-joon’s Thoughts are the Democratic Party’s Doctrine’… The Ruling Party That Has Surrendered Even its Functions as a Party. Weekly Kyunghyang.
For the traditional left-leaning media, however, it may be too late. Mr Kim has unparalleled influence over Minjoo supporters, especially its most highly engaged members. Around 300,000 people watch his live broadcast—a figure comparable to primetime audiences on CNN or Fox News in the much larger US market.
Some even call him the “president of Chungjeong-ro충정로,” the neighborhood where his office is located.
Fandoms devouring politics
Kim Ou-joon is a pioneering figure in South Korea’s post-truth media (waste)landscape. Jung Chung-rae’s victory is the most potent symbol yet of Kim’s “formidable” influence over the party.
So, where is the party headed? We’re witnessing a highly unusual dynamic. In the past, the presidential administration typically led the governing party—a natural dynamic, given that it is where the president seats. The Minjoo Party under Mr Jung, however, is taking a decidedly different approach: it seeks to lead from the left, pushing a more radical agenda. It’s far more than a “good cop, bad cop” tactic; the party’s new leadership appears to want a fundamental overhaul.
The public feud over prosecutorial reform is a case in point. Mr Jung has radicalized the party’s stance by pushing for the complete dissolution of the prosecutor’s office, raising public alarm about the future of criminal justice. The Lee administration, which bears direct responsibility for any reforms, is taking a more moderate stance.
According to attendees of a recent high-level meeting, Mr Jung and a senior presidential aide argued over the party’s role in future legislation. The exchange reportedly culminated in the aide raising his voice to stress that limiting the party’s involvement was the president’s direct intention.
Remember, all of this is happening within President Lee’s first 100 days. His government is arguably the most powerful in the republic’s history. Why is the party chief publicly displaying such discord?
The answer lies in their different audiences. Historically, the audience in politics had been a bit vague, abstract. Yes, the voters they are, but they are too many, and too diverse to pinpoint. It is critical to win over the swing voters to win an election, especially presidential one, but the swing voters swing—not easy to catch or reach.
For partisan politics in the post-truth era, the audience has never been more concrete. They are the ones writing comments on Naver, sending “text bombs” to politicians they dislike, and, above all, listening to Kim Ou-joon. They may not be enough to elect a president, but they are powerful enough to select a ruling party chief.
It’s ironic that the most powerful government ever is showing a chasm between the party and the administration earlier than ever. Or perhaps it’s not.
President Lee himself was once an outsider who leveraged support from his own dedicated online audience to gain power. He championed party reforms that diluted the influence of delegates in favor of rank-and-file members. This helped him secure the presidency, but now his successor as party chief is using the same playbook. It’s just Messrs Lee and Jung have different audiences now.
Partisan politics in the social media age
Watching President Lee’s grip on his party wax and wane, a mystery I’ve long pondered is now clearer. I often wondered: where were former President Moon’s supporters when Mr Lee took over the party? And now, where are Mr Lee’s fierce supporters?
My mistake was assuming these were distinct and exclusive groups loyal to different figures. The more plausible answer is that a replacement of allegiances occurred within the same group of highly-engaged partisans. They are largely the same people, using politicians to achieve their own sense of satisfaction.
A key concept here is what Koreans call hyoneungam효능감, roughly translating to a “sense of efficacy” or “sense of empowerment.” These activists find satisfaction less in achieving long-term policy goals and more in the immediate feeling of power—the ability to influence events by mass-posting on party forums or “text-bombing” politicians.
These new partisan actors, empowered by social media, still rally around political figures as their predecessors did, but their primary focus is on themselves, reflected in the politicians they support for the moment. The object of their political adoration is interchangeable because the ultimate goal is to see their own power and influence validated.
As president, Mr Lee must now take direct responsibility for his decisions, making him naturally more cautious on key issues. That may be good for the nation, but the bad news for Mr Lee is that this mobilized base can always find a new, more radical champion for its causes.
Despite these internal fractures, President Lee and the new party leadership still find common ground on certain issues, such as decriminalizing breach of trust—a move that would conveniently benefit Mr Lee, who has a suspended court case on this very charge: one less legal front to fight after his term.
More discord ahead
The fractures are also factional. The Lee administration is a coalition of different factions, with a notable absence of officials from the Moon Jae-in administration. The situation is worse among mid-level officials; I heard a former Moon administration official complain that the current government intentionally discriminates against those who served under President Moon.
Although Mr Jung hasn’t publicly sworn allegiance to the Moon faction, its members are now gathering around him. Some Lee loyalists even suspect they are colluding with Cho “Luke Skywalker” Kuk’s party in the run-up to next year’s local elections. Mr Cho, who served as justice minister in the Moon administration, is widely considered Moon’s political successor—a prospect Mr Moon himself seems to enjoy.
Multiple factors, including demographic shifts and conservatives shooting themselves in the foot, contributed to the most powerful Minjoo government of the Sixth Republic. The early emergence of fractures between the party and the administration is a direct consequence. Had the party not enjoyed a near-supermajority, its chief would not dare to be openly at odds with the president.
Mr Jung rallies the new partisans by promising to finish the radical reforms Mr Lee is reluctant to fulfill. How far can he go? Only as far as any politician who refuses to compromise. At that point, the new partisans will simply find a replacement.
And that replacement will likely be whomever Kim Ou-joon nudges.