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Just as in any corner of the developed economies, you can see NIMBYs in Korea. If you stroll through the streets of Hongdae, you’ll see placards condemning the Seoul city government for pushing forward its plan for a garbage disposal facility.

Not just about unpleasant facilities. When construction begins on a new apartment complex, neighboring residents often welcome it with black-and-red placards decrying its environmental harm—as if their own apartments were built without any of the environmental footprints they denounce.

It gets more interesting when you travel away from the capital. You will be surprised to see that some cities actively seek to attract corporate facilities—mainly R&D but sometimes manufacturing as well—in their vicinity. The success of Pangyo and Pyeongtaek taught them that having good jobs nearby is crucial to their property value.

Then it becomes quite mind-boggling, however, when you find out they still don’t want any infrastructure like substations, which are critical to the very facilities they desire. What they say they want contradicts itself. One extreme but not-so-rare case involves residents refusing an additional cellular repeater due to concerns about electromagnetic radiation. The best part is that they still snap when their cell reception is poor, demanding a fix. Cet obscur objet du désir…

K-NIMBYism in foreign policy

I often see this kind of strange NIMBYism in Seoul’s foreign policy. After breaking some export records, it now expects its defense industry to buttress its slowing economy. Yet it struggles to realize many of its shiny weapon systems are not battle-proven. While boasting about the size of its military and arsenal, Korea’s armed forces have not fought a war for decades. There’s a war raging in Europe, the single biggest market for its defense industry, yet Seoul prefers to sit by, refusing to “take sides” even after Pyongyang has weighed its full weight in.

It’s part of the identity crisis Korea is undergoing. While fascinated by all the glitter its economic and cultural prowess has generated, Seoul refuses to acknowledge that its elevated status on the world stage calls for more duties and contributions. Its self-image is ambivalent: once it’s a glamorous K-pop star, then it’s a victim of war and colonialism who needs all the sympathy in the world.

Korea has the potential to lead the post-colonialism world as soon as it sublates its identity crisis. It is arguably the only nation that transformed itself from a colonial victim to a developed economy. But it can’t afford to reflect on where it stands in the world as its consciousness is consumed by the politics of vortex. Kim Dae-jung helped establish the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats with Southeast Asian leaders more than three decades ago; now Korea’s presence is absent from the organization. Seoul’s foreign policy is still fixated on the world powers and Pyongyang.

Ignorant of its standing in the world, Korea’s foreign policy has been all about maintaining the status quo. The world order as we knew it is, however, changing. Maintaining the status quo is little more than drifting, and my baseline scenario is that the drift will continue.

Seoul’s foreign policy NIMBYism knows no partisanship—what did Yoon Suk-yeol actually do about Ukraine?—however, progressive administrations pose more uncertainty risks. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s flip-flops on the recent NATO summit are a good case for my argument.

Double flip-flop on the NATO summit

It began with some reports in early June stating Mr Lee was not going to the summit, citing “senior officials.” When I tried to check them, the outlets had already removed the stories. This usually means that the President’s office was quick to react.

Despite all the rants about “fake news,” the media does not report false stories in tandem without good reason—especially when it’s about the President. It appears that the President’s office was surprised by the reactions, decided to step back, and scrambled to kill the stories. (Sometimes administrations leak on purpose to gauge the public’s reaction.)

Partly in response to these reactions, the office said that Mr Lee was “positively” considering attendance. During the second and third weeks of June, reports indicated the atmosphere inside the office leaned toward attending.

However, the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites upended the vibe. Right after the strikes, the office announced that “considering various domestic issues and uncertainties arising from the Middle East,” Mr Lee would not attend the summit. As if the Korean peninsula were located next to the Qatari one.

Who is behind the decision? Examining the org charts gives no clue. Both the Director of National Security—the Korean equivalent of the US national security advisor—and the foreign minister are career diplomats and are known to be public servants by nature, having no distinct views from the MoFA default, which cherishes relations with the Western world.

You need to look at the ‘old boys’ network. Former unification minister Jeong Se-hyun, one of the six ‘old boys’ who have influenced Minjoo-lineage administrations, reportedly advised Mr Lee against attending the summit.

Why did he oppose?

“NATO now has an anti-Russian character as an organization supporting Ukraine,” Mr Jeong recalled advising the president. “The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, with its decidedly pro-US foreign policy, has consistently participated in [the summit], but repeatedly attending it is falling for Japan’s scheme to create an ‘Asian NATO.’”

Mr Jeong is the most radical among the six, yet they share a common worldview and aim—namely, “strategic autonomy” for Seoul. (This is another lingering legacy of Roh Moo-hyun, who envisioned the nation as a “balancer” in Northeast Asia.) In practice, it often means “autonomy” from the United States, the most dominant force in Seoul’s foreign policy, and a closer alignment with its opposing force.

But what geopolitical leverage does Seoul have to exercise such autonomy? Its export-reliant economy is already apprehensive about the looming Trump tariff. In Trump’s “red pill” world, only hard power speaks.

Downside scenarios

The Lee administration has been performing quite well in general—just look at the stock market!—but its first crisis is likely to originate externally due to the factors described above.

The US

The first and foremost concern is the US. It’s not just about the tariff. The US under Trump 2.0 is reviewing its global strategy and it will soon affect the ROK-US alliance. It will still take some time for Washington to finally execute the pivot to Asia, which was first announced by the Obama administration, but it will be done nonetheless.

But will Korea have a place in it? Korea is often omitted in the blueprints of the pivot discussed in the US. Elbridge Colby, the third-ranking official in the Pentagon, reportedly inquired of Tokyo and Canberra what they would do in the event of war over Taiwan. There is no mention of Seoul. Did Mr Colby ask Seoul the same question, or did he not bother to do so?

The transfer of the wartime military control, namely OPCON, is a potential trigger for the alliance’s undoing. Some in the administration—although their identities are never mentioned in the media, one can infer—have already suggested the transfer could work as “leverage” in the tariff negotiation, as they view the USFK as crucial to the US strategy against China.

Military posture can be readjusted. Washington has every reason to be concerned that a president whose view on the cross-strait relations is saying xie xie to both Beijing and Taipei will not let the USFK take part in a war over Taiwan once Seoul assumes OPCON. With the USFJ actively seeking to elevate its status, Washington may allow the USFJ command to assume command of the USFK.

Despite the Minjoo elders’ skepticism regarding the US, surveys show the public still approves of the alliance. That is why Minjoo administrations have been very quick to react every time a suspicion of anti-Americanism is raised. However, Korea has a long history of anti-American eruptions, and it could happen again. And enter Mr Trump, who is very well poised to be the next Anton Ohno in the upcoming Lee-Trump summit. Forgive my wild imagination, but Minjoo spin doctors might seek to reverse their political misfortune in the future, using Mr Trump as he did with the ruling parties in Canada and Brazil.

Japan

If the public’s trust in the US proves too strong even for Mr Trump, Minjoo progressives can always turn to their beloved punching bag, namely Japan.

Anti-Americanism and anti-Japanism in today’s Korea have much in common: 1) they were very real with good reasons. 2) however, they had been all but dead for a long time. Japan has almost always been the top tourist destination for Koreans. Competition reality shows featuring singers of both countries have been a hit.

But there are two stark differences: 1) anti-Japanism is quite safe for politicians whereas anti-Americanism these days often invites suspicions of China/North Korea apologia. 2) it re-erupted recently in 2019, while anti-Americanism has been largely dormant since 2008.

The differences induced an interesting phenomenon: progressives beating Japan as a mirror image of the US. When I think about it, I am somehow reminded of how 20th century western communists sought alternative allegiances in China, Cuba, even North Korea instead of Soviet orthodoxy.

Minjoo had a great success with it in 2019. No reason not to try it again when things aren’t going well.

While Ishiba Shigeru is a good fit with a Minjoo administration—he also seeks for greater “autonomy” for Japan—his days appear to be numbered. Whoever comes next, Korea-Japan relations will face increased risks.

China

No way China would miss the opportunities the Lee “Xie Xie” Jae-myung presidency provides.

Beijing has already begun the charm offensive. Through multiple channels, it is cajoling Mr Lee into attending its Victory Day parade in September. Some within the administration suggested Mr Lee should attend. They still believe that moving towards Beijing (and even Moscow) would confer more “balance” on Seoul. However, Mr Lee would prefer not to bear the burden of being suspected of anti-Americanism early in his term.

Beijing has many cards in its sleeve. One potential measure is allowing the import of Korean cultural products. Despite reports of Beijing lifting the ban, the import has not yet resumed.

With its film and TV sectors struggling with tepid growth, Seoul could not take Beijing’s offer lightly. Beijing can control the trade of cultural products—what to allow, when to shut down—with precision and little impact on its own industry, as it has few intermediate goods.

Thanks to the diplomat S for reviewing the draft of this post.

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